A comparative study of interlocking directorates at the end of the import-substituting industrialization period in Argentina and Chile by Salvaj, Erica & Lluch, Andrea
REDES- Revista hispana para el análisis de redes sociales 
Vol. 23, #3, Diciembre 2012 
http://revista-redes.rediris.es  
 
80 
 
A comparative study of interlocking directorates  
at the end of the import-substituting industrialization 
period in Argentina and Chile1 
Erica Salvaj- Universidad del Desarrollo. Chile2 
Andrea Lluch- CONICET. Argentina3 
Abstract 
Research on interlocking directorates has been conducted primarily in the United 
States and European countries. Little work of either theoretical or empirical nature 
has been done to study the characteristics and the factors that affect this important 
business network in peripheral and turbulent economies.  In this comparative and 
historical study, we focus on the effect of the political and economic turbulence and 
the ownership composition of the largest firms on shaping the structure of 
interlocking directorates in Argentina and Chile by the end of the sixties. Four main 
findings result from this analysis: 1) the interlocking directorate in Argentina is 
more fragmented than in Chile; 2) most relevant actors in the directorship interlock 
in Argentina are firms in industries considered strategic by the government; 3) 
multinational subsidiaries occupy a central position in Argentina; 4) banks and firms 
owned by local business groups played a central role in the interlocking directorates 
in Chile.  This study shows how the institutional and economic factors shape the 
structure of relations between companies. 
Keywords: Political and economic turbulence, interlocking directorates, Companies 
from Argentina and Chile 
Resumen 
La investigación sobre redes de directorios se ha llevado a cabo principalmente en 
los Estados Unidos y los países europeos. Escasos son los trabajos de investigación, 
ya sea de la naturaleza teórica o empírica, que han estudiado las características y 
los factores que afectan a esta importante red inter empresarial en economías 
periféricas y turbulentas.  En este estudio comparativo e histórico, nos centramos 
en el efecto de la turbulencia política y económica y la composición de la propiedad 
de las empresas más importantes en la configuración de la estructura de las redes 
de directorios en Argentina y Chile a finales de los años sesenta. Las principales 
conclusiones de este análisis son las siguientes: 1) las redes de directorio son mas 
fragmentadas en Argentina que en Chile, 2) la mayoría de los actores mas 
relevantes en la red argentina son empresas de sectores considerados estratégicos 
por el gobierno, 3) las filiales de multinacionales ocupan una posición central en 
Argentina, y 4) los bancos y las empresas de propiedad de grupos de negocios 
locales jugaron un papel central en la red de directorios chilena.   Este estudio 
muestra cómo los factores institucionales y económicos afectan la estructura de 
relaciones entre empresas.  
Palabras clave: Turbulencia política y económica, redes de directorios, empresas 
de Argentina y Chile 
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Introduction 
In many countries around the world, board networking started in the late 19th 
century as a means to coordinate and organize business operations. Since then, 
interlocking directorates (IDs) –created when two companies share a common 
director- have been under the intense scrutiny of scholars and policy planning 
groups (Mizruchi, 1996; Hambrick, Werder & Zajac, 2008).   
IDs provide social capital to companies (Windolf, 2008; Haynes & Hillman, 2010) 
and have been associated with several types of organizational outcomes.  
Interlocking directorates enable information transfers, mitigating opportunistic 
behavior (Mizruchi, 1996). Additionally, board networks build board differentiation 
(Podolny, 2001), affecting companies’ legitimacy and reputation (Davis & Robbins, 
2004; Kang, 2008; Rhee & Valdez, 2009; Bucheli & Salvaj, 2012).  IDs have been 
related to firm´s performance. For instance, Silva, Majluf & Paredes (2006) have 
proven that family and board networks bear a positive impact on Chilean 
companies’ results when voting share concentration is low and controlling 
stockholders’ voting rights match their economic rights. 
IDs have also been used as control mechanisms across companies (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). For example, business groups in Chile and Argentina use IDs 
extensively to control and drive information flows across their companies (Khana & 
Rivkin, 2006; Lluch, Salvaj & Barbero, 2011). Finally, these networks may also be 
used to build ties with local governments (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Canella, 
2008). For instance, in Chile, Spanish multinationals’ subsidiaries tend to rely on –
more than other companies- directors with close ties to the government (Bucheli & 
Salvaj, 2009). 
As a result, studying this sort of ties proves very useful to understand how cross-
organizational relationships are set up and how a country’s economy is organized. 
In recent decades, researchers have applied sophisticated network analysis 
methods to examine board social capital and to map ID structure in multiple 
country environments (Stokman, Ziegler & Scott, 1985; Windolf, 2002; Corrado & 
Zollo, 2006). However, most theoretical and empirical studies on corporate network 
structure have been conducted in countries with stable institutional environments 
(e.g., the United States and Europe) and are primarily based on public companies 
(Windolf, 2002; Davis, Yoo & Baker, 2003; Salvaj & Ferraro, 2005; Corrado & Zollo, 
2006). 
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Thus, considering the many forms interlocking directorates have adopted 
(Granovetter, 1993; Rinaldi & Vasta, 2005), these practices should be analyzed in 
multiple, formerly neglected settings. This research study intends to fill this gap in 
the literature, exploring these practices in Argentina and Chile in order to illustrate 
the fact that two countries with a similar type of capitalism can have very dissimilar 
interlocking directorates structures. 
Following this last proposition, and based on a sample of 165 Chilean firms and 116 
Argentine companies, we argue that differences in institutional environments and 
largest firms’ ownership structure affected ID schemes in both countries by the end 
of the 1960s.  Four key findings are presented here: 1) Argentina’s interlocking 
directorates are more fragmented than in Chile; 2) in Argentina, the most relevant 
business actors in directorship interlocks are firms in industries viewed as strategic 
by the government; 3) multinational subsidiaries hold a central position in 
Argentina´s corporate network; 4) banks and firms owned by local business groups 
have played a leading role in Chile’s interlocking directorates. 
The article has been organized as follows. The section below describes corporate 
board systems in Argentina and Chile, providing an explanation of boards’ links as 
well. The second section explores the differences in institutional and economic 
environment separating Chile and Argentina, taking a look at largest firms’ 
ownership composition and its impact on interlocking directorates. The third section 
discusses the role played by several types of companies in interlocking directorates, 
using network centrality measurements. Finally, the last section summarizes 
findings and conclusions. 
The board of directors and the interlocking directorates   
The board of directors ranks among the most important institutions in the national 
corporate governance system. In the late 1960s, while Chile employed a simple 
directorship system, companies in Argentina were able to divide competencies 
between their board and an executive or management committee (consisting of 
some directors). However, as this scheme was not mandatory, few companies 
actually applied this system, hindering Argentina’s categorization as a country using 
the Latin system (Stokman et al 1985). The Latin system featured a two-board 
scheme, with separate auditing and administrative boards.  It was only in 1972 that 
Act 19,550 provisioned the existence of an Oversight Council, but it was (and 
continues to be) optional. At this time, syndics, who represented shareholders, 
audited Argentine corporations. It was the syndic’s responsibility to examine the 
corporation’s books and to review its financial statements, annual reports, and 
matters relating to its compliance with local laws. Also, the syndic represented all 
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company shareholders on the board of directors and was thus legally provided with 
more power than other members of the board.  This position was also usually 
reserved for certified public accountants and financial advisers and did not 
necessarily come with an interest in the company (Tokman, 1973). 
Board members were appointed at shareholders’ meetings and entrusted with the 
immediate management of corporate businesses.  At that time, neither Argentine 
nor Chilean laws required a specific number of board members. Board tasks 
included business management, property administration, and personnel 
governance. Board members also shared unlimited liability for their managerial 
decisions and for compliance with current laws, by-laws and shareholder meetings’ 
decisions.  
Companies often invited reputable members of the local business community and 
trusted executives to join their boards, and these individuals could serve at several 
boards at the same time. These directors who simultaneously sat at more than one 
board built interlocking directorates (Mizruchi, 1996). As noted earlier, an ample 
body of literature has analyzed board networks from a historical point of view as an 
“important institution of emerging organized capitalism” that did not replace the 
market but performed significant –and changing- roles in the late 19th century’s 
capitalistic economies. Windolf (2008) argues that the appearance of large public 
companies destroyed the organizational basis of the corporate world dominated by 
family networks and enterprises. Corporate networks –mostly emancipated from 
ascriptive relations as family or ownership- emerged as a new institution for 
coordinating business transactions that grew more professional and legally 
regulated also in the late 19th century, as reported by Windolf (2008), Useem 
(1984) and Koenig, Gogel, and Sonquist (1979), it became professionalized and 
legally regulated. 
Institutional Setting and Organizational Scheme  
Environmental turbulence: Political and economic setting  
The “resource dependence” theory claims that environmental turbulence affects 
interlocking directorates usefulness (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Shropshire, 
2010). By environmental turbulence, we refer to the external complexity and 
uncertainty companies face (Boyd, 1990). Environmental turbulence is 
characterized, in our study, by political and economic volatility, non-cohesive local 
business communities, struggles between corporate groups with conflicting 
economic interests, armed forces’ intervention, as well as political and ideological 
polarization.   
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While Chile and Argentina share some common traits, the turbulence in their 
economic and institutional settings differed during the period studied here. As a 
result of the severe impact by the Great Depression, starting in the 1930s, both 
countries similarly shifted towards development strategies associated with 
industrialization and import substitution (ISI) policies (Ardanaz, Scartascini & 
Tommasi, 2010). Their ISI models rested on two main pillars: a closed economy 
(high tariff barriers, quotas and exchange controls) and a strong role of the State 
(government expenditure as a large share of GDP, extensive regulations, and an 
increasing presence of state-owned firms) (Sapelli, 2003). However, Argentine and 
Chilean economic growth dynamics differed. Over the second half of the 20th 
century, Argentina’s economic performance deteriorated, and a volatile growth 
pattern emerged, with growth paths consistently interrupted by crises leading to 
GDP drops, followed by slow recovery periods, only to return to previous levels 
years later. On the contrary, from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s, Chile 
experienced rather stable growth as opposed to Argentina’s recurrent ups and 
downs (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002). 
Argentina’s ISI policies led to rapid industrial sector development, but exports did 
not expand much, and over time this lay at the core of the economic stagnation 
that marked the eventual collapse of that development model in the 1970s. This 
period featured a remarkably continued application of the general policies 
associated with an ISI strategy. Nonetheless, a more radical ISI approach was 
rolled out after 1954, with a focus on input supplying and capital goods sectors as 
well as on promoting industrial exports. In 1958-1962, the so-called 
“developmental” administration’s economic program revisited the notion of 
accelerating by boosting investments, concentrating on a few capital-intensive and 
import-substitution sectors (Barbero & Rocchi, 2003). Later, Onganía’s military 
regime (1966-1970) also fostered industrialization.  First, the relation between 
internal and external prices was distorted to protect Argentina’s manufacturing 
sector. Second, a complex investment incentive scheme was created to promote 
the local industry, and a “buy national” program was launched (Acuña, Galiani & 
Tommasi, 2006). Third, direct government investments in industries viewed as 
strategic –namely, iron and steel, petrochemical, and paper and pulp also promoted 
industrialization. Fourth, the government extended financial facilities through 
BIRA/BANADE (state-owned banks) loans. 
Chile’s economic policy also was characterized by the application of ISI strategies, 
even if Alessandri’s government (1958-1964) -a conservative party leader and 
businessman- made some attempts at liberalization moves. These steps helped 
stabilize inflation and encouraged economic growth while drawing the country 
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partially away from an inward-looking industrial development strategy. However, 
many of these liberalization policies were short-lived. Growing imports and 
increased government spending on public works and housing resulted in a trade 
imbalance and an overvalued currency.  Starting in 1962, a balance-of-payments 
crisis led to a “peso” devaluation and the restoration of trade protectionism (Kline, 
1992).   
Frei Montalva’s administration promoted a mixed economy, with the government 
playing a more active role.  Frei Montalva championed the so-called “Revolución en 
libertad” (Revolution in Freedom”), marking the onset of a copper mine 
expropriation process and an agrarian reform. This program sought to secure an 
interest for Chile (eventually 51 percent) in the ownership of the country’s large 
copper mines, along with commitments to expand production. At that time, two-
thirds of the Chile’s export revenues came from this industry, but most mines were 
owned by American companies (Kline, 1992).  Despite Frei’s reform plans, in the 
late 1960s, Chile’s economy had not improved, and, between 1950 and 1970, its 
economic performance was the poorest among Latin America's large and medium-
sized countries. 
In terms of political instability, there is a clear difference between both countries. 
Democracy prevailed in Chile between 1932 and 1973, and only two elected 
presidents ruled the country in the 1960s. On the contrary, Argentina’s stop-go 
economic cycles and the proscription of the Peronist Party from electoral 
competition since 1955 caused significant political instability.  From 1955 to 1963, 
the country had five presidents –only one of them was democratically elected. In 
1962, the ruling democratic president Arturo Frondizi was overthrown by another 
military coup. For two years, Senator Guido, a puppet of the military, served as 
surrogate president. The next democratically elected government was also short-
lived. President Illia was elected in 1963 and ousted by a military coup in 1966. 
Since then, three generals alternated in office. Social turmoil and growing political 
violence unrest forced Onganía to resign in 1970 (Bozzoli, della Paolera & Irigoin, 
2003:51).   
Much of Argentina’s political instability boiled down to a struggle between corporate 
groups with conflicting economic interests, with the armed forces intervening, but 
not always in the same direction (Barbero & Rocchi, 2003).  The corporate elite was 
greatly divided through the 1960s, and the nationalistic program adopted by 
Ongania’s regime caused more friction between the government and traditional 
business groups (BGs) with international connections. A clear demonstration of 
these conflicts arose in 1967, when the country’s largest companies, including 
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multinationals, withdrew from active participation in the UIA (Argentine Industrial 
Union), the most important business association, and created the Consejo 
Empresario Argentino (Argentine Business Council). At the same time, the UIA 
began to draw away from liberalism, shifting toward a stance more akin to 
economic nationalism and criticizing the “denationalization” of Argentine industry 
during Onganía’s dictatorship (Brennan, 2007).   
The 1960s also featured increasing political and ideological polarization among 
several groups in Argentina and Chile (Solimano, 2004). Starting in the mid 1960s, 
Argentina experienced an earlier and shocking rise in political violence. Gradually, 
this violence became normal, and, in a certain way, it was accepted by much of 
society, even as a legitimate means to settle conflicts (Romero, 2009). A complex 
political juncture, characterized by a deterioration of institutional expression 
channels, paved the way for the emergence of left-wing guerrilla organizations.4  In 
Argentina, unlike what happened in Chile, guerrilla groups that kidnapped 
prominent businessmen, demanding hefty ransoms, especially targeted foreign 
companies and executives. It is difficult to assess the impact of such activities 
before 1973. However, in 1965, there were fewer than ten incidents per month, 
while, by June 1976, before the last military coup, over 300 incidents were reported 
every month (Holmes, 2001). Time Magazine estimated that 60 percent of foreign 
businessmen left Argentina in 1973, prompted by the kidnapping of 170 managers 
that year (Gillespie, 1982). Former Argentine executives have indicated that 
serving at boards increased public exposure and therefore the threat of 
kidnappings, reducing the incentives to join them. Indeed, violence against 
businessmen may have undermined incentives for corporate elite members to 
participate as directors and the creation of links among companies, adding a new 
element to the uncertain scenario described earlier (Boyd, 1990).   
Chile's business environment was somewhat different in the same period. Chilean 
businessmen, together with major corporate associations, exerted a stronger 
influence on public policies than their Argentine counterparts, and their leverage 
was strengthened by the smaller size and geographic concentration of Chile’s 
business elite (Zeitlin & Ratcliff, 1988; Ross Schneider, 2004).  Alessandri 
Rodriguez’s administration held close ties to local business interests, guaranteeing 
a continuation of policies favoring less state intervention and regulation (Kline, 
1992).   
                                                 
4 Two of the most important groups were the Peronist Montoneros and the Trotskyite Revolutionary 
People’s Army (ERP) (Skidmore & Smith 2001). In Chile, the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) was 
founded in 1965 and went underground in 1968. It carried out armed actions from underground in an 
attempt to seize power through insurrection (until Salvador Allende’s victory in 1970). 
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In Argentina’s volatile context of the late 1960s, firms’ ability to formulate long-
term strategies and outside directors’ contributions to board monitoring and 
resource supply tasks were reduced (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). A more 
troubled and complex decision-making context made it hard for boards to receive 
and exploit directors’ outside experience (Shropshire, 2010), which, in turn, 
undermined the appeal of recruiting multiple directors.  Testimonies of Argentine 
directors who served at boards during that period indicate that some firms avoided 
discussing strategic issues at board meetings to retain some flexibility to respond to 
the country’s changing political and economic setting. 
Argentina’s political and economic turbulence curtailed the benefits potentially 
afforded by interlocking directorates as well as the incentives to bring outside 
directors into boards. As a result, the number of links among companies dropped, 
hampering interlocks schemes. We argue that, while both countries were immersed 
in turbulent settings, Chile’s business environment, characterized by a more serene 
coexistence, allowed for the survival of corporate links. Instead, Argentine 
corporate elite’s ideological division, social dissolution and violent atmosphere may 
have reduced the use of board networks among firms as a common practice and 
effective mechanism to achieve business unity (Mizruchi, 1996; Burris, 2005). 
Ownership and organizational structures 
While economic and institutional instability underlay businessmen’s behavior 
throughout this period, economic reforms driving changes in economic elites’ 
composition and traits in both countries also proved influential. As noted by earlier 
studies on other countries, businesses’ organizational formats and ownership 
schemes also shaped ID structures (Rinaldi & Vasta, 2005; Khana & Rivkin, 2006; 
Corrado & Zollo, 2006). For example, Rinaldi and Vasta (2005) explored 
interlocking directorates at Italian joint-stock companies between 1952 and 1972.  
They found differences between the interlocking strategies of corporations and 
smaller companies. 
The specificities of Argentine and Chilean capitalisms and their respective ranges 
and forms of state intervention in the economy led, nearing the end of the ISI 
phase, to two different enterprise ownership schemes. Particularly noteworthy was 
the dissimilar share of local business groups and multinationals’ subsidiaries among 
Argentina’s and Chile’s largest companies. In the early 1970s, revenue rankings 
featuring Argentina’s 100 largest companies reveal how important business groups 
were as compared to other organizational forms –foreign multinationals (MNEs), 
state-owned companies, and stand-alone domestic private companies. By then, 
Argentine sales rankings showed that, among the leading 100 firms, MNEs took the 
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lead (with 52.6% of overall sales), while state-owned companies and domestic 
private firms held similar shares (23.4% and 24%, respectively) (Competencia 
Económica magazine, 1970). This latter group included a similar share of firms 
belonging to business groups and stand-alone private companies. In a nutshell, 
until the mid 1970s, local business groups played a lesser role in Argentina than in 
Chile; additionally, companies owned by Argentine business groups did not rank 
among the country’s largest firms (with the noteworthy exception of Bunge y Born 
group), as their counterparts did in Chile.  However, a recent study by Lluch, Salvaj 
and Barbero (2011) has argued that business groups in Argentina tended to build 
relatively more board links than the largest Argentine companies.  
Conversely, business groups were the predominant form of corporate structure in 
Chile, and most Chilean largest corporations were controlled by families (Zeitlin et 
al 1988). Table A1 (in Appendix) shows the controlling proprietary interest of the 
37 largest corporations in Chile in 1966, revealing that local families controlled 30 
of them. In addition, families were highly interrelated, as proven by the number of 
Chilean corporations included in table A1 that were controlled by associated 
families. Chile displayed a more concentrated family stock ownership, with major 
corporations largely controlled and managed by family networks. Some classical 
studies have characterized this phenomenon as the supremacy of a so-called 
“kinecon group,” a complex unit in which economic interests and kinship bonds are 
inextricably intertwined (Zeitlin et al 1988).  As noted by Khana and Rivkin (2006), 
Chilean business groups’ companies have largely relied on board ties. In fact, board 
links point to group boundaries. Bucheli and Salvaj (2011) reported differences in 
the linking strategies among multinationals’ subsidiaries, Chilean groups’ firms, and 
state-owned companies in Chile’s telecom industry. According to these authors, 
Chilean business groups were more prone to building board ties.    
The fact that business groups weighed more heavily in one of these economies than 
in the other may be also attributed to Argentina’s public policies in the 1960s, 
which favored foreign companies over domestic groups. The governments in this 
period tended to promote the inflow of foreign investment (FDI) as a development 
strategy. This process climaxed during Frondizi’s administration (1958-1962). FDI 
Act 14,780 was passed in 1958, with extremely favorable terms for MNEs (Mallon & 
Sourrouille, 1975). As a result, capitals began to flow in and investments grew; 
between 1959 and 1962 FDI totaled US$ 500 million (Barbero & Rocchi, 2003). 
Ninety percent of the newly established MNEs -60% of which  were American- 
focused on the chemical, petrochemical and oil, transport, metallurgy and electric 
and mechanical machinery industries (see table A2 in Appendix) (Sourrouille, 
Kosacoff & Lucangeli, 1985).    
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Between 1961 and 1966, FDI declined, but, as Onganía took over, there was a 
change in the role assigned to foreign capital. As a result, in 1967, 1968 and 1969, 
the value of such authorizations was US$ 13.1 million, US$ 31.5 million and US$ 
59.1 million, respectively (Sourrouille, 1976). In 1967-1969, FDIs concentrated 
primarily on short-term financing and the acquisition of existing assets.  
The studies mentioned above corroborate that ownership differences point to 
dissimilar interlocking strategies that bear an impact on corporate network 
structures. According to these studies, business groups tend to build more board 
ties. Thus, as business groups in Chile consistently ranked among the nation’s 
largest firms, it is our hypothesis that the share of companies linked by interlocking 
directorates was higher than in Argentina. We also expect that the average number 
of links per company was also higher in Chile than in Argentina.  
Indeed, our findings confirm that institutional and economic turbulence differences 
as well as dissimilarities in the largest firms’ ownership structures in the late 1960s 
led to significant differences in interlocking directorates schemes in Chile and 
Argentina. Based on an initial graphic analysis,5 interlocking directorates among 
Chile’s largest companies (Figure 1) shows that the network core in Chile was 
bigger and denser, while Argentina’s network (Figure 2) was more fragmented and 
dispersed, with a smaller core as well.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Interlocking directorates – Chile. 
 
                                                 
5 In these figures, nodes are firms, and a tie between any two firms represents the directors both firms 
have in common.  The width of the tie represents the number of directors shared by two firms.  Node 
sizes vary according to betweenness centrality. The bigger the node, the more central the company is.   
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Figure 1 shows that the number of ties among boards was remarkably greater in 
Chile, while Argentina’s boards’ network featured a lower number of lines, 
indicating fewer ties or shared directors. Also, Chile’s network displayed dense 
cliques, signaling a larger number of lines joining companies that belonged to the 
same business group. As a result of the small number of companies belonging to 
the same business group in Argentina’s directorate interlocking network, such 
dense cliques are not found in Figure 2.  
The larger nodes in Figure 1 represent firms and banks owned by Chilean business 
groups (see Table 2 for betweenness centrality). Instead, in Figure 2, the two 
largest nodes represent multinationals’ subsidiaries (see Table 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Interlocking Directorates – Argentina. 
 
These graphic results are corroborated by the structural parameters found in Table 
1. Our total sample contains 116 Argentine firms and 165 Chilean companies (see 
the Appendix for a detailed description of data sources, and Table A3 for a list of all 
firms classified by industry and ownership scheme).  
Line 4 (see Table 1) shows the number of financial companies. Argentina’s 33 
financial companies had 272 directors, while Chile’s 25 financial firms appointed 
211 directors (see line 5).  Line 6 shows that the Argentine system featured more 
directors (861) than its Chilean counterpart (588), despite the facts that 
Argentina’s company sample is smaller and that, on average, Argentina had smaller 
boards (8) than Chile (9) (See line 7). 
Lines 8 and 9 record the number and percentage of connected and isolated firms, 
respectively.  While the percentage of isolated firms in Argentina was 46 %, it was 
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only 6% in Chile, indicating that Argentina’s network was more fragmented and 
dispersed. The number of marginal firms (with only one or two ties) and isolated 
companies (no ties) was also higher in Argentina than in Chile (see lines 10 and 
11), underscoring our previous argument of a more fragmented corporate elite in 
Argentina and a more cohesive one in Chile. 
The number of firms in the main component (which only includes the firms that 
share board members; firms with no interlocks are excluded) or the network core is 
reported in line 12.  As shown, Argentina’s network core only included 43% of all 
firms, while nearly all Chilean firms, 94%, took part in their country’s network core. 
Line 13 shows the number of companies remaining in the network once lower-than-
2 ties (sharing fewer than two directors –this procedure is known as 2m-slices) are 
removed. In Argentina, only 16 companies remain in the network when these ties 
are removed, while this number rises to 97 in Chile. Once again, this proves 
Argentina’s network was much more fragmented than its Chilean counterpart.  
We also compared the number of ties and density of the Argentine and Chilean 
networks as well as their main components (see lines 14 to 16). Argentina featured 
81 lines, while Chile boasted 755. Of the total set of possible connections among 
Argentine firms, 6% occurred within the network core (or main component); 
considering all ties, the density increased to 7.2%. In Chile, these percentages 
were 5.6% and 8.1%, respectively.  
Considering indirect ties or networks’ communication structure, we have to look at 
the diameter and average distance between reachable pairs of firms. Both diameter 
(the longest geodesics of the network -i.e., the length of the path between the two 
most distant nodes) and average distance were higher in Argentina than in Chile, 
signaling the lower network cohesiveness of Argentina’s corporate elite (see lines 
17 and 18). 
The average degree of both network and main component is higher in Chile than in 
Argentina (see lines 19 and 20 in Table 1). Average degree is a better measure of 
overall cohesion than density, as it does not depend on network size; thus, average 
degree can be compared between networks of different sizes.  While Argentina’s 
network average degree stood at 1.6, Chile’s was 11.5.  Chilean firms relied on 
interlocks more heavily as a tool of coordination and control. 
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 Country Argentina Chile 
 Year 1970 1970 
1 Total sample 116 165 
2 Number of non-financial firms 83 140 
3 Total number of persons 589 377 
4 Number of financial firms 33 25 
5 Total number of persons 272 211 
6 
Total number of directors in financial and industrial 
firms 
861 588 
7 Average board size (number of board members) 8 9 
8 Number and percentage of connected firms  63 (54%) 157 (95 %) 
9 Number and percentage of isolated firms 52 (46%) 8 (6 %) 
10 Number and percentage of marginal firms 35 (30 %) 25 (15 %) 
11 
Isolated and marginal firms as % of total number of 
firms 
76% 20% 
12 % of firms in main component 50 (43 %) 155 (94%) 
13 Number of firms in 2m-slices 16 (14%) 97 (59%) 
14 Total number of lines 81 755 
15 Density (main component - dichotomized) 6 % (74 lines) 
5.6 % (755 
lines) 
16 Density (main component) 7.2 % 8.1 % 
17 Diameter 11 7 
18 Average distance to main component 4.269 2.838 
19 Network average degree  1.638 11.539 
20 Main component average degree  2.96 12.232 
21 Number of interlockers 63 159 
22 Number of big linkers 11 74 
23 Interlockers as % of directors 7% 27% 
24 Big linkers as % of directors 1% 13% 
Table 1. Structural parameters. 
 
Interlockers (directors who hold two or more positions in the network) and big 
linkers (directors who hold three or more positions in the network) point to network 
redundancy (see lines 21 to 24).  As the number of companies in the sample is 
higher in Chile, the percentage of multiple directors is smaller in Argentina (7 %) 
than in Chile (27 %), as line 23 indicates. Chilean network’s greater redundancy 
provided more opportunities to exercise control.   
In short, Table 1 findings confirm our hypothesis. While both countries pursued ISI 
development strategies and faced social and economic turbulence in the late 1960s, 
Argentina experienced a more unstable economic environment, with more political 
turmoil and a less cohesive business community than Chile. These external 
conditions affected Argentina’s interlock network structure, reducing the average 
number of ties per firm and heightening fragmentation in its boards’ network. In 
contrast, Chile’s more politically stable environment (until 1970), its cohesive 
power elite, and greater local business group engagement contributed to the 
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creation of a higher number of links among Chilean firms, producing a dense board 
network.   
Actors’ centrality 
Differences separating Argentina’s and Chile’s interlocking directorates also bore an 
impact on the role played and positions held by companies in those networks. 
Several centrality measures provide a greater insight into the roles played by 
companies in both countries’ board networks in the late 1960s (see Appendix for 
centrality measures definitions).  
The role of business groups   
According to the arguments detailed in the previous section and focusing on 
betweenness centrality, it is clear that nine out of Chile’s ten most central 
companies belonged to domestic business groups. Chilean business groups’ 
companies largely ranked among the nation’s largest firms and actively pursued 
board ties. Three firms in the ranking -Compañía Cervecerías Unidas (beverages), 
Chilena Consolidada de Seguros de Vida (insurance), and Banco Edwards- were 
controlled by the Edwards business group (owned by a financially and politically 
influential family of English origin that has played a significant role in Chilean 
politics, especially as owners of the most influential newspaper, El Mercurio). 
Empresas Copec was controlled by the Bulnes business group, the Banco 
Hipotecario (Mortgage Bank) business group, as well as the Castillo and Claro 
families. The list is completed by Cementos Bio Bio (Briones Business Group), 
Ganadera Tierra del Fuego (traditional families from Southern Chile), Banco de 
Chile (a group of minority investors), Banco Español de Chile (a bank controlled by 
the García and Pico families), and Banco Panamericano (Said Business Group). In 
Chile, only one company owned by a multinational, Compañía de 
Telecomunicaciones de Chile, was included in this betweenness centrality ranking. 
On the contrary, in Argentina, only two firms in this ranking were owned by local 
business groups -Loma Negra and Celulosa (the last, belonging to the so-called 
Grupo Fabril).     
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Chile Argentina 
Company 
Bet. 
Cent. 
Industry Owners Company 
Bet. 
Cent 
Industry Owners 
Cementos Bio Bio 4.826 Cement 
Chilean 
Family 
Siemens 
Argentina 
2.05 
Electric 
Prod. 
Foreign 
Compañía 
Cervecerías 
Unidas 
4.898 Beverages 
Chilean 
Family 
Pasa 
Petroquímica 
2.06 Chemical Foreign 
Ganadera Tierra 
del Fuego 
5.033 Agribusiness 
Chilean 
Family 
Duperial 2.11 Chemical Foreign 
Empresas Copec 5.709 
Forestry/ 
Petroleum 
Chilean 
Family 
Bco Nacional 
del Desarrollo 
2.11 Banking State 
Chilena 
Consolidada de 
Seguros de Vida 
5.932 Insurance 
Chilean 
Family 
Bco. Popular 
de Quilmes 
2.75 Banking Argentine 
Cia. Telecom. de 
Chile 
5.955 Telecom Foreign Electrolor 2.75 Chemical 
Argentine/Fore
ign 
Banco de Chile 6.537 Banking Chilean 
Celulosa 
Argentina 
3.36 
Paper/ 
Forestry 
Argentine 
Banco Edwards 7.090 Banking 
Chilean 
Family 
Loma Negra 5.13 Cement 
Argentine 
Family 
Bco. Español de 
Chile 
7.969 Banking 
Chilean 
Family 
Cristalerias 
Rigolleau 
8.41 
Glass & 
Packaging 
Foreign 
Bco 
Panamericano 
10.094 Banking 
Chilean 
Family 
Minera Aguilar 8.53 Mining Foreign 
Table 2. Top Boards by betweenness centrality. 
 
We additionally ran a Mann Whitney test, excluding firms without interlocks -the 
final sample included 50 Argentine firms and 155 Chilean firms.  First, we sought to 
establish any centrality differences among business groups’ and family-owned firms 
and companies that did not belong to either business groups or families in both 
Chile and Argentina. The results are depicted on Table 3. Once again, our findings 
indicated that Chilean business groups’ firms and family-owned businesses were 
significantly more central (across all centrality measures) than their counterparts in 
Argentina. 
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Companies owned by 
business groups/families  
Foreign ownership and  
local firms 
Financial and non-financial 
institutions  
  Chile Argentina Chile Argentina Chile Argentina 
  Main component Main 
component 
Main 
component  
Main 
component 
Main  
component 
Main 
component 
Variable Z-
score 
Sig. Z-
score 
Sig. Z-
score 
Sig. Z-
score 
Sig. Z-
score 
Sig. Z-
score 
Sig. 
Degree -3.2 0.0014** -
0.287 
0.774
2 
1.387 0.165
5 
-
0.594 
0.552
5 
-
1.524 
0.1275 1.628 0.103
4 
Betweenn
ess 
-1.842 0.0655* 1.234 0.217
3 
1.324 0.185
4 
-0.28 0.779
7 
-
3.335 
0.0009
** 
0.06 0.951
9 
Eigenvect
or 
-3.372 0.0007** 0.574 0.566
2 
1.559 0.119 -
1.213 
0.225
1 
-0.51 0.6104 1.453 0.146
4 
# of firms 155   50   155   50   155   50   
+ significant at 10% level, * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level 
 
Table 3. Mann Whitney test 
 
The role of Multinationals  
As mentioned earlier, MNEs played a more decisive role in Argentina’s industrial 
development during the ISI period than they did in Chile. As a result of the policies 
to promote foreign direct investment, foreign firms weighed more heavily in the 
local economy. Among Argentina’s 100 largest companies, foreign firms posted 
63.3% of all sales in 1957, 76.6% in 1962 and 79.4% in 1969 (Khavisse & 
Piotrkowski, 1973). Foreign companies, particularly the larger ones, operated in 
highly concentrated markets, with just a few players, where Argentine private 
enterprises’ engagement was only secondary (at least until 1970) (Azpiazu & 
Kosacoff, 1985).  
Instead, in Chile, FDI seized control over the most important mining activities. In 
the 20th century, up to 90% of FDI concentrated in Chile’s mining operations, 
focusing primarily in copper. Foreign firms also invested in electrical utilities and 
telephone services, but, despite the relative growth of some industrial investments, 
MNEs did not dominate the country’s light manufacturing sector. Chile’s natural 
resources explain much of this pattern, since only its mineral wealth was well 
recognized at the time, and the country’s small consumer market had but little 
appeal for foreign investors (Kline, 1992). As noted earlier, local BGs appear to 
have been more decisive than MNEs in Chile, despite the occasional foreign (mainly 
U.S.) pressures on local governments. While foreign and domestic business 
interests often coincided, especially when it come to assuring limited state 
intervention in the economy, when they diverged, local BGs successfully influenced 
several Chilean administrations to shift toward more favorable, pro-local business 
policies (Kline, 1992). Considering the less prevalent role of MNEs in Chile’s 
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industrial sector, multinational corporations were more central in Argentina than 
Chile by 1970. 
In fact, as Table 2 shows, six foreign owned companies ranked among the ten most 
central firms in Argentina, while only one foreign firm showed up in Chile’s ranking.  
These findings also suggest that multinationals were integrated into Argentine 
corporate networks, ranking among the most connected firms, but they were not 
significantly more connected than domestic firms (see Table 3). This may be 
associated with the important role played by MNE subsidiaries in Argentina’s 
industrial development.  
This research also revealed that the level of internationalization or interconnections 
among Chilean and Argentine boards was very low by the late 1960s.  Indeed, our 
findings show that only two directors, Fernando Carles and Felix Van de Walle, 
served at boards on both sides of the Andes.  Argentine and Chilean firms sharing 
one director were owned by American corporations. Cristalerías Rigolleau and 
Cristalerías de Chile were controlled by Corning Glass, while Embotelladora Andina 
and Coca Cola Argentina belonged to Coca Cola, and Squibb was a subsidiary of an 
U.S.-based pharmaceutical company. 
The role of banks 
Previous research has emphasized two dominant models for the role of banks in 
corporate networks (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999).  The first stated, “interlocks are a 
means of control that allows banks to build up interest groups of firms, which are to 
serve the bank’s interests. This power derives from their quality both as lenders 
and as large shareholders.” The second model emphasized “reciprocal relationships 
between banks and industry, where coordination, not dominance, is the prevailing 
mode of interaction: bank – industry ties are mutual rather than directed from the 
former to the latter.” This model depicts interlocks as an expression of cohesion 
within the ruling class and as a means for this unity to be maintained and 
furthered.  
This research study shows that banks played a central role in Chile, coordinating its 
corporate elite –a role banks did not play in Argentina. As Table 2 shows, four 
banks appeared among the most central firms in Chile’s network in Chile –namely, 
Banco Panamericano, Banco Español-Chile, Banco Edwards, and Banco de Chile. In 
turn, Argentina’s ranking featured only two: Banco Popular de Quilmes and Banco 
Nacional de Desarrollo. In Argentina, the evidence proves that banks did play a less 
significant role as corporate network connectors. Why did banks not serve as big 
linkers?  This may be attributed to two features: 1) companies’ ownership structure 
(discussed earlier), and 2) Argentina’s business financing scheme. Back then, 
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Argentina’s capital market was not a relevant source of funding for companies; in 
fact, its performance in this regard weakened in the 1960s, as a result of highly 
volatile economic conditions. Neither did private banks offer long-term loans for 
industries. However, the business groups that emerged in the 1960s did not branch 
out into finance as much, and none of the main BGs emerging in the post WWII 
period was organized around a bank, although the Techint group had financial 
investments and other groups had extensive contacts with private banks and 
financial firms.  
Private financing may have been scarcely relevant because companies largely 
sought their funding from long-term loans provided by Argentina’s Banco Industrial 
(BIRA-1944), followed by Banco Nacional de Desarrollo (Banade-1970), and from 
international loans enabled by institutions like the Inter American Development 
Bank and the World Bank. By 1954, BIRA concentrated half of all industrial loans. 
Through official banks’ operations, the State grew its interest in the economy, not 
only as a loan provider but also as a manager of state-owned and private 
companies. The State’s increased interest in private firms’ equity came as a result 
of weaknesses in companies’ structures, especially in financial firms (Rougier, 
2004), or, in other cases, as a result of decisions made by economic officials to 
drive some firms. BIRA’s –and, then, BANADE’s- operations were shaped by 
Argentina’s economic and institutional instability. In 1967-1976, 11 chairmen stood 
at its helm, and none of the 40 directors who served at its board stayed on for 
three full years.  
Instead, national development banks in Chile did not play the same role. In 1965, a 
new decree (Number 16,253) alloyed the creation of development banks. Yet, a 
series of restrictions were imposed, and the first bank was founded in late 1974.  
Since 1968, Banco Estado was authorized to operate as a development bank, but 
its medium and long term lending volume remained low due to the low incentives 
to attract long-term funds, although the demand for such loans was high (Behrens 
Fuchs, 1985).  
In Chile, the stock market did not fully develop as a source of capital. 
Couyoumdjian, Millar & Tocornal (1993) suggest that companies rarely listed their 
stock to raise funds from external investors. In this setting, capital markets did not 
play a significant role in resource allocation, and, as a result, the period from 1920 
to 1970 was characterized by a steady decline of both the number of stock market 
transactions and the stock market’s value over Chile’s GDP (Islas, 2010).    
Lefort & Walker (2000a) argue that financial repression and credit rationing during 
a large share of the 20th century gave way to the extensive use of internal capital 
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markets and the subsequent emergence of bank-centered groups in Chile. Large 
companies belonging to social networks had access to cheap financing trough 
associated banks (Lefort, 2010). Private banking was controlled by BGs that also 
controlled monopolistic firms in other economic sectors. For example, the Yarur 
Banna BG owned more than 50% of Banco de Crédito e Inversión and controlled 
both Banco Llanquihue and Banco Continental; Banco Nacional del Trabajo and 
Banco Panamericano lay at the core of another BG (with interests in the textile 
industry): the Said group; Banco Edwards was controlled by the namesake family.  
The Matte BG owned Banco Sudamericano, while Banco Israelita belonged to the 
Litvak Decepter family. Chile’s largest private bank, Banco de Chile, was at center 
of intense financial fights among clans, as several BGs held an interest in it 
(Behrens Fuchs, 1985). 
A mechanism that facilitated the control of banks by economic groups was ID. 
Chilean banks stood at the center of BGs, and banks’ directors often served on the 
boards of several companies in Chile. In 1968, 52 directors of the five largest banks 
held 316 board seats; in 1970, a Banco de Chile director also served as a board 
member in 13 other corporations; and, at the same bank, every director 
represented at least three other companies.  Our Mann Whitney test revealed 
significant differences in the betweenness centrality of Chilean banks. Table 3 
shows that banks were more central than non-financial institutions in Chile in terms 
of betweenness centrality. In short, we find that banks were more central in 
Chilean interlocks and that private banks played an intermediation and coordination 
role that their counterparts in Argentina did not have. 
Big linkers 
A company is central when the directors sitting at its board also serve at other 
companies’ boards, becoming multiple directors or big linkers. Who and how many 
were the big linkers in Chile’s and Argentina’s networks? Multiple directors or big 
linkers were more common in Chile than in Argentina (see table 1, lines 21 to 24). 
Table A4 (in Appendix) lists the big linkers in both countries’ networks.   
Chile’s list was dominated by businessmen -a more classical scheme, largely 
discussed in current literature, with businessmen serving as “linkers,” revealing 
shared control relationships or strategies to control other firms with common 
investment projects. Eliodoro Matte, the director boasting the highest betweenness 
centrality, served at the boards of its group’s bank and several of its companies, as 
well as in many other companies, including Banco SudAmericano, Aceros Andes, 
Renta Urbana Pasaje Matte, Empresas CMPC, Empresas Industrial El Melón, Minas y 
Fertilizantes, Ganadera Tierra del Fuego, Forestal, Constructora y Comercializadora 
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del Pacífico Sur, and ABN AMRO Chile Seguros de Vida. In Argentina, such 
centrality was far less common, and Enrique Roberts stood out as the Argentine 
director with the greatest betweenness centrality (see Table A4) –he sat at the 
boards of Alpargatas, Cristalerías Rigolleau, Banco Frances del Río de la Plata, and 
Minera Aguilar and was particularly noted for his strong ties to the banking sector. 
However, comparatively, Argentine businessmen were less involved in interlocking 
–in fact, fourteen out of twenty directors were engineers, lawyers, government 
officials, or certified public accountants. Thus, we argue that a common attribute 
shared by Argentine big linkers was their engagement in government as advisors or 
in other capacity, especially in military regimes and administrations favoring pro-
business policies. Still, it should be noted that these individuals were largely low-
profile men in the late 1960s –a characteristic that, since then, businessmen 
cultivated as political violence grew.  
We hypothesize that, in Argentina’s troubled business environment, firms -
particularly MNEs- tended to choose to include well-connected legal and financial 
advisors and government officials in their directories, as these individuals would 
know how to navigate the changing conditions created by political and economic 
instability, powerful labor unions, regulations, different stabilization plans, and 
idiosyncratic credit allocation practices (Guillen 2000:367). Attorneys, engineers 
and accountants specialized in providing a full range of legal services and helping 
multinational corporations to deal with institutional barriers to. As a result, these 
professionals (acting as syndics) and government officials played a more important 
role in Argentina’s elite network than their counterparts in Chile.  Indeed, our 
findings seem to match those of Bearden and Mintz (1992:192), who note that, in 
the United States, outside directors (that is, board members who do not actively 
participate in a company’s daily operations and have no significant stake in its 
equity) are responsible for network cohesion and unity.  
Conclusions 
Primarily, this study on board ties schemes in place in Argentina and Chile over the 
1969-1970 years has underscored how organizational structure changes shaped ID 
schemes in individual countries. Second, this study has explored an area that has 
been largely neglected by current literature, as few authors have looked at board 
interlocks in countries with underdeveloped financial markets and few publicly 
traded companies in local corporate business structures. Additionally, it expands 
the focus of past literature works on how institutional settings and national 
business systems might influence how larger companies organize their corporate 
networks when dealing with environmental conditions.  
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Our comparative analyses indicate the importance of two factors: environmental 
turbulence and, most significantly, ownership structures. Concerning the former, 
our results suggest that the economic and political turbulence that characterized 
Argentina throughout this period undermined the social capital typically provided by 
interlocks in more stable settings. The results reported here support the notion that 
a volatile environment may hinder the access to and transfer of knowledge and 
decrease board receptivity (Shropshire, 2010). As described, in Argentina’s case, 
the evidence seems to corroborate that, in a politically turbulent setting, firms may 
be cautious to appoint executives or businessmen with strong ties to a regime, as 
any sudden political changes may quickly turn that asset into a liability jeopardizing 
firm performance. Furthermore, this study has also revealed that violence against 
businessmen and a fragmented corporate community may reduce directors’ 
motivations to serve on multiple boards. As a result, network average degree and 
density (interpreted as an indicator of the mass of moral capital) were higher in 
Chile, and, therefore, so were group control and social integration (Windolf, 2008).  
Indeed, this study seems to confirm the theory that benefits from social ties are 
dependent on environmental context (Burt, 1997; Gulati and Higgins, 2003). 
Argentine firms, embedded in a more uncertain political and economic 
environment, relied less on board ties than their counterparts in Chile. 
Consequently, board networks in Argentina were more dispersed and fragmented 
than Chile’s ID.   
As noted earlier, ID practices were also and more crucially shaped by ownership 
structures (Rinaldi and Vasta 2005, Khana and Rivkin 2006). The absence of BG 
firms among Argentina’s largest companies and the role played by state-owned 
banks as primary credit providers might have curtailed firms’ inclination to resort to 
ID. On the contrary, Chilean firms seemed to rely more heavily on ID as a means to 
control and coordinate their operations. We have argued that Chilean BGs used ID 
as a specific control mechanism. For example, group managers and owners sitting 
on the boards of banks routinely monitored the flow of financial resources. Chilean 
BGs also used ID to control affiliated corporations and to integrate with other 
organizations. This is partially consistent with research studies in recent years. For 
instance, Chilean BGs’ controllers tapped into a relatively small number of people in 
order to manage their businesses, and these individuals served exclusively at 
boards of corporations affiliated to their respective groups (Lefort & Walker, 2000b; 
Majluf, Abarca, Rodriguez & Fuentes, 1998; Silva, Majluf & Paredes, 2006). Director 
interlocks are particularly significant for economic actors in Chile, as they 
collectively build BG boundaries (Khanna & Rivkin 2006).  
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This study has also shown differences between Argentina and Chile regarding the 
distribution of social capital among firms. Firms in industries considered strategic 
by Argentina’s government lay at the core of its network, boasting more social 
capital at board level (Haynes & Hillman 2010).  Indeed, Argentina’s top ten firms 
included several multinationals and a few local companies in strategic sectors, like 
Acindar, Loma Negra, Dalmine, Pasa, Siemens, Duperial, Celulosa, and Esso. In 
Chile, banks stood out in corporate networks as well as firms owned by domestic 
BGs. As a result, Chile’s corporate elite connectivity required a more central role for 
banks and highly concentrated corporate ownership. 
Finally, the findings reported here seem to indicate that a dense corporate network 
in Chile may have fueled an interest to strengthening inter-firm alliances, with 
board networks developing into a comprehensive control instrument that facilitated 
cooperation within a community of interest (Windolf, 2008). Our study also 
suggests that, while significant, Argentine board interlocking efforts may have been 
less widespread as a means to disseminate corporate practices and structures as 
well as to reduce uncertainty and to build trust among firms, pointing to the many 
forms adopted by ID in similar but different environmental conditions.  
Research limitations 
The results of this study are subject to limitations inherent to data availability. 
First, findings are restricted to the largest firms in Chile and Argentina.  Future 
research efforts could examine the ID strategies of state-owned companies and 
other medium-sized firms controlled by BGs that did not rank among Argentina’s 
and Chile’s largest corporations in by 1970. This study raises further questions that 
cannot be readily answered with current data. For example, future studies might 
explore the distinctive tasks performed by corporate networks and boards in either 
country, and it would also be useful to secure more direct evidence on how ID 
influenced the operations of large corporations and the behavior of corporate elites 
at the end of the ISI period (both Argentina and Chile adopted pro-market reforms 
in the mid 1970s).  In particular, a long tradition of research has focused on the 
role of business elites, characterizing them as exclusionary (Tokman, 1973). 
However, recent research has suggested that greater social cohesion among 
community members leads to more prosperity (Marquis 2003). Future research 
studies might explore the effects of cohesive corporate elites in Latin America and 
their role in economic development. Finally, a longitudinal study would help to 
determine whether the differences separating Argentina and Chile are consistent 
over time or are associated to the specific historical period analyzed here. 
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Appendix 
 
Corporation Controlling Proprietary Interests 
Pacific Steel Co. (CAP) Corfo and Amortization Institute 
Paper & Cardboard Mfg. Co. Matte family and associates 
“El Melon” Industrial Enterprises Cortés family and associates 
South America Steamship Co. (CSAV) Vial and MacAuliffe families and associates 
Sumar Products Sumar family 
United Breweries Co. Edwards family and associates 
General Industries Electricity Co. Claro family and associates 
Petroleum Company of Chile (COPEC) None disclosed 
Tierra del Fuego Cattle Braun-Menendez family and associates 
Lota-Schwager Coal Cousiño and Claude families with Cortés 
family  
Mantos Blancos Mining Enterprise Mauricio Hochschild and associates 
Yarur Chilean Cotton Products Yarur Banna family  
Hirmas Cotton Hirmas family 
The Industrial Co. (INDUS) Edwards family and associates 
Copper Products (MADECO) Simonetti family and associates 
Viña del Mar Sugar Refining Co. (CRAV) Edwards and Claude family and associates 
Metal Mfg. (MADEMSA) Simonetti family and associates 
Santiago Gas Consumers Co. (GASCO) Claudio Troncoso and associates 
El Mercurio Journalism Enterprises Edwards family 
“Pasaje Matte” Urban Rental Association Matte family and associates 
Caupolican Textiles Yarur Banna and Grace interests 
Glassware of Chile Corning PPG joint control with Cousiño y 
Edwards  
National Distributing Co. (CODINA) Schmutzer family with Edwards and 
Claude families 
Penco National Ceramics Factory 
(FANALOZA) 
Díaz family and associates 
Enamelware Factory (FENSA) Briones family and associates 
Zig-Zag Publishing Enterprises Helfmann family and associates 
Said Rayon and Chemicals Ind. 
(RAYONSAID) 
Said Family 
Bella Vista – Tomé Cloth Factory Yarur Asfura and Grace interests 
Tomé National Fabrics Furman family and associates 
Petroleum Navigation Corp.  Braun-Menéndez and Vial families 
Chile Interoceanic Navigation Co. Braun-Menéndez family 
Progreso Textiles Yarur Kazakia family 
Saavedra Benard Bank of Chile 
Universo Printing & Lithography Helfmann family and associates 
Oruro Mining Co. Mauricio Hochschild and associates 
Tamaya Mining Co. Jointly by Corfo and private interests 
Coronel Shipping Cousiño and Claude familias 
Source: Zeitlin & Ratcliff, 1988. 
 
Table A1. Control of the Top 37 Non-financial Corporations in Chile, 1964-1966 
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Year Legal Authority Sector Country of Origin 
Act 
14222 
Circulars 
2324/383
1 
Act 
14780 
Transport 
Equipment 
Chem. 
Prod. 
Machin
ery 
Other U.S. Germany Others 
1958 - 4.9 12.9 1.2 4.2 5.1 2.4 6.4 0.4 6.1 
1959 - - 209.3 63.1 85.4 6.7 54.0 106.5 14.2 78.5 
1960 - - 111.7 18.0 63.6 6.9 23.2 71.3 11.7 28.7 
1961 - - 133.3 51.7 32.0 2.1 47.6 74.5 1.5 57.3 
1962 - - 85.7 1.6 11.6 5.4 67.2 70.1 2.7 12.9 
1963 - - 34.6 14.4 1.3 7.2 11.7 15.7 1.0 17.9 
1964 - - 33.8 20.7 1.1 6.6 5.4 0.5 1.9 21.3 
1965 - - 6.3 0.3 0.4 2.4 3.3 2.0 0.7 2.6 
1966 - - 2.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.7 0.8 0.4 1.3 
1967 - - 13.1 9.2 0.7 0.1 3.0 9.9 0.8 2.9 
1968 - - 31.5 13.1 6.6 3.7 8.1 20.9 2.0 8.6 
1969 - - 59.1 5.2 46.2 2.7 5.0 12.0 0.8 46.3 
1970 - - 9.8 - 0.1 - 9.6 0.2 1.6 8.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Economic Report, several issues, and Decrees of the National Executive 
Branch. quoted in Sourrouille, Juan (1976) "The Impact of Transnational Enterprises on Employment and 
Income: The Case of Argentina", World Employment Program Research, Working Papers, Geneva: 
International Labor Office, p. 22. 
Table A2. Authorizations for foreign capital investments (in US$ millions) 
 
 
Data collection process 
We used a sample of the largest Argentine and Chilean firms in the late 1960s. We 
identified the largest firms in Chile based on several criteria (Chile Economic News, 
published by CORFO, does not list the largest Chilean firms in 1967–1973).  First, 
from El libro de las 91 (AAVV, 1972), we identified 91 monopolistic firms operating 
in Chile in the early 1970s. We collected information on 63 of these firms; we also 
used that list to catalog  65 of the top 100 firms by annual traded value in 1969, as 
registered on the Santiago Stock Exchange. We included 10 of the largest state-
owned firms and the 25 largest banks in 1969, listed by Behrens Fuchs (1985). Our 
final database thus featured 165 Chilean firms. We gathered information about 
their board composition from Chile’s Superintendency of Banks and Financial 
Institutions, Superintendency of Securities and Insurance, and annual reports.  In 
Argentina, we collected information on 82 large firms by sales, according to 
Competencia Económica (1970) magazine’s ranking. We also gathered information 
on Argentine companies’ board composition in 1971 from Guía de Sociedades 
Anónimas (1972). From the ranking provided by Bancar (1973), we extracted 
information on 33 of the 50 largest Argentine banks in the early 1970s, including 
their syndics. Table A3 records the number of companies in every industry, listed 
with their respective ownership scheme.  
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Table A3. Sample data 
 
Method 
 
We employed social network analysis to test our hypotheses, studying board 
networks connected by directors serving at Chile’s and Argentina’s largest 
companies, using UCINET’s software (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The first 
step in our comparative analysis was a review of their graphical representations. 
We used Netdraw (network visualization package bundled with UCINET).   
Next, we calculated and compared networks’ structural measurements (see Table 1 
and its description). Thirdly, we identified the most central actors or those with high 
dominance and social capital in the network. A number of measures can capture 
board centrality, including degree centrality, eigenvector, and betweenness 
centrality (Scott, 2007; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This study encompasses three 
centralities (though we have only presented the results for betweenness centrality 
due to the high correlation linking all three). Degree centrality refers to the number 
of boards to which one board is connected, while eigenvector centrality offers a 
variant of the simple degree. Based on this measure, a node is more central if the 
nodes to which it connects are also central (Bonacich, 1987). Hence, a board 
connected to many well-connected boards earns a high score, but a board 
connected only to near-isolates gets a lower score, even if it boasts high degree 
 
 
Ownership 
Local 
families 
State- 
owned 
Other 
domestic MNCs 
Local 
families - 
MNCs 
Other 
domestic 
- MNCs 
State-
owned – 
other 
domestic Total 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Argen
tina Chile 
Manufacturi
ng 22 38 2 7 5 17 41 11 4 2 1 0 2 1 77 76 
Financial 
services 9 14 4 3 9 5 6 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 33 25 
Insurance 0 7 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
Utilities 0 1 1 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 
Mining 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 
Transportati
on 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Commoditie
s 0 7 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 
Services   1 5 0 0 0 0 6 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 
Holdings 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Total 32 80 8 13 14 41 50 27 4 2 1 0 7 2 116 165 
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centrality. Betweenness centrality suggests that a board lying on communication 
paths can control communication flows and is, therefore, important. Betweenness 
centrality counts the number of geodesic paths between i and k on which board j 
resides; a geodesic line is the shortest path between a pair of boards (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994). Thus, this measures indexes the extent to which a board facilitates 
the flow of information across the corporate elite and “brokers” relationships in the 
network.  
Finally, to investigate differences separating centrality measurements for financial 
versus nonfinancial institutions, foreign-owned versus local firms, and firms owned 
by business groups versus non-business group-owned firms, we used the Mann-
Whitney test. We employed this nonparametric test because the distribution of the 
centrality measurements was non-normal (Hollander & Wolfe, 1999). 
 
Argentina Chile 
Director´s 
name 
Bet. 
Cent. 
Profession Government official Director´s 
name 
Bet. 
Cent. 
Profession Government official 
Diego Arguello 0.067 NDA NDA Agustin    
Edwards      
Eastman         
0.031 Businessma
n 
No 
Jorge Eduardo 
O'Farrell       
0.075 Lawyer No Salustio 
Prieto         
Calvo          
0.032 Businessma
n 
 
No 
Damian Beccar 
Varela 
0.084 Lawyer No Edgardo  
Cruz         
Plaza           
0.033 Engineer Superintendent of 
Electricity Services 
Enrique 
Steggman    
0.084 Businessman National 
Undersecretary of 
Industry and Mining 
(1962); Mineral 
Trade Chairman 
(1962) 
Recaredo 
Ossa     
Undurraga           
0.033 Businessma
n 
No 
Jose Negri   0.089 Engineer No Jorge Ross  
Ossa               
0.034 Chemical 
Engineer/ 
Businessma
n 
No 
Jorge Nicolas 
Zaefferer Toro 
0.089 Lawyer Undersecretary of 
Economy (1959-
1962) / Secretary 
of Commerce 1962 
Aurelio  
Fernandez      
Barros           
0.036 Lawyer No 
Emilio 
Gagliardi 
0.095 Engineer NDA Jorge Silva          
Romo               
0.036 Lawyer No 
Silvio Gagliardi 0.095 Engineer General Director of 
State Supplies, 
Director of Forestry 
Investments 
Anacleto 
Angelini        
Fabbri            
 
0.04 Businessma
n 
No 
Rodolfo 
Moltedo             
0.108 Lawyer No Felix Huttner         
Skall                
0.04 NDA NDA 
 112 
 
Alberto Lopez 0.126 Certified 
Public 
Accountant 
General Director of 
Credit Taxes 
Jorge Raby 
Birrel               
0.041 Lawyer No 
Carlos Alberto 
Juni      
0.126 Lawyer Secretary of State; 
Former minister 
Ernesto 
Barros         
Jarpa             
0.045 Lawyer Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
(1921/1926/1942) 
Carlos Dietl 0.129 Engineer no Manuel      
Zanartu       
Campino       
0.045 Engineer/ 
Businessma
n 
No 
Andrea 
Wynveldt       
0.151 Certified 
Public 
Accountant 
no Vicente 
Izquierdo          
Besa            
0.048 Engineer/ 
Businessma
n 
No 
Eduardo Maria 
Huergo 
0.156 Engineer Minister of Public 
Works and National 
Industry 
Intervention in 
Córdoba 
Pablo  
Aldunate      
Phillips             
 
0.069 Lawyer State 
Representative 
(1957 - 1961) 
Jorge Decarli 0.17 NDA NDA Hector Braun       
Guevara              
0.07 Businessma
n 
No 
Juan Pedro 
Thibaud    
0.214 Engineer Undersecretary of 
Energy (1966); 
Undersecretary of 
Mining and Oil 
(1967) 
Arturo 
Quiroz   
Fitzsimmons              
0.084 Engineer/ 
Businessma
n
No 
Gaston Texier   0.234 Businessman No Guillermo 
Correa    
Fuenzalida    
0.091 Lawyer Minister (1937-
1938);  Minister of 
Justice(1946-
1947); 
Representative of 
State (1930-1934) 
Alfredo Lisdero          0.254 Certified 
Public 
Accountant 
YPF Advisor (1940-
46)  and UIA 
Advisor  (1940-52) 
Walter   
Muller          
Hess           
0.11 Businessma
n 
Chilean 
Ambassador in USA 
Turing Cuba-US 
crisis 
Eduardo 
Johnson 
0.318 Certified 
Public 
Accountant 
No Patricio  
Garcia          
Vela          
0.118 Businessma
n 
No 
Enrique 
Roberts 
0.441 Businessman No Eliodoro 
Matte          
Ossa          
0.231 Businessma
n 
No 
Table A4. Top Linchpin Directors 
 
